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Abstract This study examines the effects of FHA and VA mortgage
ﬁnancing on home prices. Using a database of nearly 9,000
homes sales in the San Antonio, Texas area, hedonic analyses
reveal that both types of government-backed ﬁnancing are
associated with reductions in selling prices. The results may
imply a cost shifting behavior on the part of buyers and an
implicit subsidy on the part of sellers. The regressions show that
the price discounts for FHA underwriting are about 4% (3.81%
to 4.14%) relative to conventional ﬁnancing. VA discounts, as
expected, are smaller, ranging from about 2% to 3.46%. Given
the prior literature, the results are likely a result of the fact that
FHA and VA homebuyers are able to shift some costs to sellers.
This study examines the effects of FHA and VA mortgage ﬁnancing on home
prices. Borrowers using FHA and VA default protection programs borrow at higher
loan-to-value ratios (LVRs) and payment-to-income ratios (PTIs) relative to
conventional underwriting standards. Higher LVRs and PTI ratios are offset by
the payment of additional ﬁnancing costs in the form of default insurance
premiums and origination fees. Given prior evidence on the existence of the
capitalization of various ﬁnancing costs, there exists the possibility that FHA/VA
ﬁnanced properties will attract price discounts. That is, given that FHA/VA
borrowers are required to pay additional ﬁnancing costs, one could expect that the
reservation prices, and ultimately bids, for FHA/VA borrowers, might be lower
than for a conventional borrower in an attempt to offset the burden of the
additional fees. Sellers, faced with high opportunity costs and a selling process
that is typiﬁed by a series of sequential bids, may accept what is in fact a low,
early bid from a buyer in an attempt to minimize opportunity costs.
The basic hypothesis in this study therefore is that, assuming buyer bids above
seller reservation prices, the ‘‘low’’ FHA/VA buyer bids might lead some sellers
into accepting price discounts. The study empirically searches for evidence to
support the hypothesis of such price discounts.
This study uses a database of over 9,000 home sales in the San Antonio, Texas
(Bexar County) area to search for such price effects. The ﬁndings reveal that FHA
and VA ﬁnancing result in signiﬁcantly lower sales prices relative to conventional
ﬁnancing. The results support the supposition that the ﬁnancing costs associated
with FHA and VA origination fees are capitalized into sales prices.192  Asabere and Huffman
The next section looks more speciﬁcally at standards of the most common form
of FHA underwriting (the 203b) and the VA programs relative to conventional
standards. This is followed by a review of relevant literature, the empirical
framework, data description, and the hedonic analyses. The ﬁnal section reports
the empirical ﬁndings and conclusions.
 The FHA and VA Programs
Both the FHA and VA occupy a speciﬁc niche in the mortgage underwriting
spectrum. The FHA default insurance program began as a program to encourage
lenders to lend to lower income borrowers for the purchase of modest houses.
However, the FHA has expanded beyond its original mission. Today the program
is, at least in part, a taxpayer subsidy of high credit risk purchases for housing
by ‘‘credit-constrained’’ households with incomes sufﬁcient to offset higher loan
payments (Pennington-Cross and Nichols, 2000; and Pennington-Cross and Yezer,
2000). For these borrowers, the FHA program provides the ability to buy more
house than that possible under conventional underwriting standards (Goodman and
Nichols, 1997). Speciﬁcally, the real beneﬁt sought by FHA borrowers may be
the lower up-front costs in the form of lower downpayments and the ﬁnancing of
closing costs (Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin, 1997).
Speciﬁcally, the FHA will insure an amount that includes a beginning amount of
about 97% of an acceptable price, plus allowable closing costs and the upfront
FHA premium. The total amount insured is subject to limits ($155,000 in the
study area). However, given the amounts insurable, it is not impossible for FHA
users to have insured and ﬁnanced an amount that exceeds the original purchase
price.
The higher LVRs that result in lower downpayments also require correspondingly
higher monthly payments. The FHA therefore allows a more lenient monthly PTI
ratio of 31% (versus 28% for conventional loans).1 Thus, relative to a speciﬁc
payment, the higher PTIs result in less income needed, but note that for a similarly
priced house, the higher LVRs and premiums paid can result, on net, in more
income needed to carry the total FHA ﬁnanced payment, relative to conventional
ﬁnancing. The FHA premiums charged are not inconsequential; currently 1.5% of
the insured amount charged upfront, plus 0.5% of the outstanding balance paid
annually.2,3
The VA has increased its default guarantee program limits as well, although its
program is of course limited to a much smaller market and its costs are limited
to a funding (or origination) fee. VA loans offer default guarantees that require
no premium and unless VA limits are exceeded, a 100% LVR. While there are no
monthly premiums as such, the VA requires the payment of an origination or
funding fee of about 2% by the borrower.4
In sum, relative to conventional loan underwriting, FHA and VA borrowers
purchase housing services at higher LVRs than they would otherwise be able toFHA/VA Financing and Price Discounts  193
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with conventional ﬁnancing. Offsetting the beneﬁts of lower downpayments are
additional ﬁnancing costs relative to conventional lending.
Given the above, the general hypothesis is that, given evidence of the capitalization
of various ﬁnancing costs and the speciﬁc nature of credit constraints of FHA and
VA borrowers, FHA and VA ﬁnancing costs could be capitalized into buyer
reservation values and thus buyer bids. Sellers, in turn, may accept FHA and VA
bids under the high opportunity costs scenario described below. The contribution
in this study is to examine the hypothesis that these borrowers, faced with higher
ﬁnancing fees, seek to mitigate the costs of these programs by making lower bids.
 Prior Literature on FHA and VA Effects
A number of issues associated with FHA underwriting and loan choice and the
capitalization of ﬁnancing differentials have received research attention in recent
years. Of concern here is the evidence that FHA and VA borrowers are credit-
constrained. Notable examples include Pennington-Cross and Nichols (2000), who
ﬁnd that the FHA/conventional loan choice is driven by income and credit history
with worse credit scores found for FHA borrowers. Berkovec, Kogut, and Nothaft
(2001) ﬁnd similar results for the FHA/conventional choice in the context of ARM
loans. Rosenthal, Duca, and Gabriel (1991) also ﬁnd that credit constraints affect
the FHA/VA/conventional choice. Hendershott, LaFayette, and Haurin (1997) ﬁnd
that downpayment and monthly payment constraints affect the FHA/conventional
choice. Goodman and Nichols (1997), however, ﬁnd that the credit restrictions
that lead to FHA/VA choice may be temporary, as approximately one-half of all
FHA borrowers are able to qualify for conventional ﬁnancing within one year.
Studies on capitalization effects can be separated into the effect of interest rate
costs (points) before and after the elimination of FHA and VA interest rate
restrictions on FHA and VA loans. Borrowers were prohibited from paying interest
rate differentials when speciﬁed rates on FHA and VA loans were lower than
market rates. As a result, sellers paid the interest rate differential. Sellers
subsequently shifted the points back to borrowers in the form of higher prices.
Zerbst and Brueggeman (1977, 1979) found that sellers capitalized 43% of the
effect of points for FHA loans into selling prices. Both Guntermann (1979) and
Agarwal and Phillips (1983) found partial shifting of loan discount points to
buyers by increasing sales prices, for the former, a shift of 73% for new homes,
the latter, a shift of 61% for existing homes.
Subsequent to the lifting of interest rate restrictions, the shifting of points took
the form of various seller interest rate subsidies and seller concessions to buyers.
Asabere, Huffman, and Mehdian (1992) found a 10% discount associated with all
cash transactions and Asabere and Huffman (1997) ﬁnd a 3% discount associated
with seller concessions in the form of buyer interest rate buydowns for
conventional loans. No speciﬁc discounts were found for FHA/VA loans, however.
Thus the consensus of the literature is that there is empirical support for (a) the
existence of mortgage choice criteria based primarily on credit constraints and194  Asabere and Huffman
(b) that various types of ﬁnancing costs, including loan type, interest rate,
differentials, and seller concessions have been capitalized into housing prices. This
research is a logical extension of the prior literature. The hypothesis is that such
credit-constrained borrowers may seek to capitalize these additional ﬁnancing
costs into sales prices. This study thus provides new evidence on the impacts of
mortgage choice and the role of capitalization of mortgage terms on prices.
 Additional Financing Costs and Price Discounts
Mortgage insurance premiums and origination fees offset the higher risk of default
for FHA loans. The hypothesis is that the additional ﬁnancing costs associated
with FHA/VA loans have implications for housing markets. Speciﬁcally, that the
additional ﬁnancing costs will lower buyer reservation prices and subsequently
buyer bids, resulting in price discounts.
As noted, the hypothesis is that the fees associated with FHA/VA mortgages
would dampen buyer reservation prices and therefore buyer bids. Search theory
tells us that sellers facing opportunity costs such as mortgage payments, property
taxes, maintenance costs, and other carrying costs may be signiﬁcant enough to
create rapid discounting behavior by sellers (e.g., Cronin, 1982; and Yavas, 1992).
While the seller has no benevolent intentions whatsoever to sell for less to any
buyer, the individual will eventually be forced to minimize the opportunity costs
by accepting a lower, early bid so long as the price discount does not exceed the
savings in opportunity costs. Note that an acceptance of a lower, early bid is only
acceptable as long as it exceeds the seller’s reservation selling price adjusted for
opportunity costs.
Noteworthy is the substantial literature on listing prices, price concessions, and
the impact, in particular, of selling time or time-on-the-market (most recently,
Pryce and Gibb, 2006) on sales prices.5 One implication of these studies is that
listing prices, price concessions, and sales prices are affected by a variety of
transactional factors including seller motivations and behavior. Although no
explicit examinations of the impact on opportunity costs on seller behavior are
identiﬁed, the general concept is, of course, a fundamental component of ﬁnance
theory.
Given the credit-constrained nature found for FHA users in particular, the
hypothesis is put forth that these credit-constrained buyers may offer lower buyer
bids that might be acceptable to certain sellers with high opportunity costs.6 Of
course, early, low bids may result in seller rejections and not all underbidding is
due to FHA/VA ﬁnancing. Lower buyer bids may also be a function of or
accompanied by other factors, such as stronger negotiating ability. Thus, such
seller behavior would, in effect, yield unintended, implicit subsidies (or cost shifts)
for FHA/VA buyers whose reservation prices are lower. It is, therefore, an
empirical question as to whether or not such discounts are possible under such a
scenario.FHA/VA Financing and Price Discounts  195
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Hedonic analyses are used to explore the potential price discounts associated with
FHA and VA mortgage ﬁnancing relative to conventional mortgage ﬁnancing. The
hedonic model employed to detect the partial effects of FHA and VA mortgage
ﬁnancing is as follows:
n
Sales Price   exp( FHA   VA   CON  X ). (1)  01 2 3 ij
4
Where:
Price  Sale price of the house;
FHA  FHA mortgage underwriting dummy variable;
VA  VA mortgage underwriting dummy variable;
CONV  Conventional mortgage underwriting dummy variable; and
Xij  Various housing and other pedestrian control variables.
A logarithmic transformation of Equation 1 will be used to measure the potential
effects of FHA and VA mortgage ﬁnancing relative to conventional mortgage
ﬁnancing. The estimated coefﬁcients of 1 and 2 are expected to be signiﬁcantly
negative with the effect of FHA loans (1) exceeding that for VA loans (2).
 The Analysis
The database for this study was supplied by the Ofﬁce of the Comptroller, State
of Texas. The original data consisted of over 12,000 sales of residential property
occurring over a one-year period from April 2001 to March 2002 in and around
San Antonio (Bexar County), Texas. The data contain sales price and standard
information on various price-determining factors. These factors include: housing
characteristics, lot characteristics, locational effects, and sales transaction related
characteristics. The variables also include the speciﬁc variables of interest in this
analysis: the mortgage underwriting options of FHA insured, VA guaranteed or
conventional ﬁnancing.
The transaction related variables include sales price (SPRICE), date of sale in
sequential months from April 2001 to March 2002 (MONTH), and days on the
market (DOM). The speciﬁc variables used to measure the effect of housing
characteristics are: square feet of improvements (SQFT), number of bedrooms and
bathrooms (BANDB), age of structure (AGE), and two variables to account for
exterior features: brick construction (BRICK) and type of foundation, slab (SLAB)
versus all other. Speciﬁc lot characteristics include corner lot location (CORNER),
cul-de-sac location (CSAC), and two lot improvement variables: the presence of
a deck (DECK), and in-ground pool (POOL).7
A speciﬁc neighborhood amenity (YESNEIGH) is added for the proximity of a
park or other recreational area. The location within a speciﬁc school district out196  Asabere and Huffman
of 24 districts (SD1 to SD24) that are cross-referenced with a standard map of
the area is also included.8 To account for any regional locational effects, the
location from the central business district as measured by four zones, aggregated
by ZIP Code (RING1 to RING4) is also included, beginning from the central city
district of San Antonio.9
The sales observations were eliminated due to lack of data or the likelihood that
the sale was spurious or contained unreliable information. An examination of the
data also revealed sales with signiﬁcant size differences at the upper end that
would likely exceed any FHA/VA sale. Therefore the data are limited to sales
with a maximum of 3,800 square feet (i.e., the nearest FHA/VA maximum size,
rounded to the nearest 100 square feet), and to sales with 2 to 5 bedrooms and a
maximum sales price of $255,000, the highest priced VA sale in our data, to yield
a database of 8,751 observations.10 These adjustments should yield a highly
representative, reasonably homogeneous database of FHA, VA, and conventional
sales. Summary statistics for relevant variables are found in Exhibit 1.
The speciﬁc variables used in the analysis are presented in Exhibit 2, along with
basic descriptive statistics. Using the data described above, hedonic analysis is
performed using the natural logarithm of sales price (LnSPRICE) as the dependent
variable.11
The regression in Model 1 uses the variables described above. Models 2, 3, and
4 offer alternative location variables. In Model 2, RING1, RING2, and RING3 and
school district variables are replaced with a variable that accounts for relative
locational differences by calculating the average sales price by ZIP Code
(SPBYZIP). This variable is an attempt to account for quantity/quality differences
in the sales data by location.12 In Model 3, SPBYZIP is replaced by a variable
that accounts for FHA sales as a percentage of total sales in a ZIP Code
(FHAPERC);13 this variable is used to account for any effects associated with
large concentrations of FHA sales in a given location.
The adjusted R2s for Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are 71%, 76%, 72%, and 76%,
respectively. The R2s are well within reasonably acceptable levels for explaining
sales prices in a large geographic area such as the study area. The F-Statistics for
all models are also high and statistically signiﬁcant at a 99% level of conﬁdence,
indicating acceptable statistical ﬁt for all models. An examination of
multicollinearity and standard regression diagnostics reveal no undue problems of
statistical bias. Thus, the estimated coefﬁcients for each variable are reliable.
Results
Non-Financing Control Variables. The results for all the four models in Exhibit
2 are robust. There are no real qualitative differences between the estimated
coefﬁcients of the control variables of the three models. Looking at Model 1,
BANDB, YESNEIGH, SQFT, INPOOL, DECK, and MONTH are signiﬁcantly
positive at conventional levels in all models, as would be expected. Variables withFHA/VA Financing and Price Discounts  197
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Exhibit 1  Summary Statistics for Relevant Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Sales Price 107,950 43,813 14,101 255,000
Conventional 0.51 0.50 0 1
FHA 0.33 0.47 0 1
VA 0.16 0.37 0 1
BANDB 5.4 0.95 3 10
SQFT 1,823 567 1,000 3,800
AGE 21.0 17.3 0 99
ALLBRICK 0.09 0.28 0 1
SLAB 0.92 0.27 0 1
DECK 0.18 0.38 0 1
INPOOL 0.07 0.25 0 1
CORNER 0.10 0.30 0 1
CULDESAC 0.15 0.36 0 1
YESNEIGH 0.47 0.50 0 1
DOM 59.6 67.3 0 694
MONTH 5.0 3.4 0 11
SPBYZIP 113,377 39,015 40,494 406,731
ISPBYZIP 9.8E06 3.0E06 2.5E06 2.5E05
FHAPREC 32.9 14.6 0 75
RING1 0.04 0.20 0 1
RING2 0.19 0.39 0 1
RING3 0.55 0.50 0 1
RING4 0.22 0.41 0 1
SD1 0.02 0.15 0 1
SD2 0.01 0.11 0 1
SD3 0.0003 0.02 0 1
SD4 0.007 0.08 0 1
SD5 0.0002 0.02 0 1
SD6 0.001 0.10 0 1
SD7 0.004 0.06 0 1
SD8 0.008 0.09 0 1
SD9 0.084 0.28 0 1
SD10 0.001 0.03 0 1
SD11 0.0005 0.02 0 1
SD12 0.0003 0.02 0 1
SD13 0.360 0.48 0 1198  Asabere and Huffman
Exhibit 1  (continued)
Summary Statistics for Relevant Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
SD14 0.360 0.48 0 1
SD15 0.070 0.26 0 1
SD16 0.014 0.12 0 1
SD17 0.013 0.11 0 1
SD18 0.0001 0.01 0 1
SD19 0.0002 0.02 0 1
SD20 0.0005 0.02 0 1
SD21 0.004 0.07 0 1
SD22 0.001 0.03 0 1
SD23 0.002 0.04 0 1
SD24 0.012 0.11 0 1
signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcients are AGE, SLAB, and DOM. CORNER,
CULDESAC, and ALLBRICK are insigniﬁcant in Model 1.
RING1, RING2, and RING3 in Model 1, relative to the outer RING4, are negative
and signiﬁcant. These results do not conform to classical concentric circle theory;
rather the results may be picking up the differences associated with higher priced
properties located in the less dense suburban areas of the county. Several of the
school districts in Model 1 (SD1, SD2, SD4, SD6-SD10, SD14-SD17, and SD20-
SD24), are signiﬁcant with various signs relative to one omitted district (SD13).
These results imply that there are neighborhood type effects associated with the
school district variables
FHA and VA Underwriting Variables. The estimated coefﬁcients for FHA and VA
are signiﬁcantly negative at the 99% level of conﬁdence in Model 1, with a
coefﬁcient of 0.0604 for FHA and 0.0458 for VA. These transform to partial
effects of about 5.9% for FHA and 4.5% for VA. These effects are slightly higher
than the coefﬁcients found in Models 2, 3, and 4.
Model 2 includes a variation on SPBYZIP (ISPBYZIP) and drops the other location
variables. The coefﬁcient for ISPBYZIP is signiﬁcant and negative, as would be
expected for the inverse of SPBYZIP. Regressions on SPBYZIP and Ln(SPBYZIP)
found signiﬁcant and positive coefﬁcients. The coefﬁcients for FHA and VA are
0.0423 and 0.0206, respectively, which transforms to 4.14% and 2.0%.
Model 3 includes the FHAPREC variable that measures the concentration of FHA

























































Exhibit 2  Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variable  t-value  t-value  t-value  t-value
FHA 0.0604 11.03*** 0.0423 8.40*** 0.0388 7.09*** 0.0414 8.14***
VA 0.0458 6.78*** 0.0206 3.34*** 0.0352 5.33*** 0.0204 3.32***
BANDB 0.0098 2.79*** 0.0124 3.83*** 0.0111 3.17*** 0.0125 3.85***
YESNEIGH 0.0734 14.89*** 0.0483 10.74*** 0.0561 11.62*** 0.0481 10.71***
SQFT 0.0004 66.44*** 0.0003 58.84*** 0.0004 57.66*** 0.0003 58.58***
AGE 0.0022 10.17*** 0.0014 8.39*** 0.0021 11.44*** 0.0014 8.47***
DOM 0.0001 4.06*** 7.5E05 2.41** 0.0002 5.61*** 7.9E05 2.51**
INPOOL 0.1010 10.87*** 0.1070 12.54*** 0.1080 11.73*** 0.1070 12.56***
BRICK 0.0002 0.02 0.0007 0.09 0.0023 0.29 0.0005 0.07
SLAB 0.0305 2.36** 0.0219 2.14** 0.0153 1.38 0.0202 1.95*
CORNER 0.0111 1.46 0.0128 1.83* 0.0117 1.56 0.0127 1.83*
CSAC 0.0078 1.18 0.0037 0.62 0.0076 1.17 0.0038 0.64
DECK 0.0607 9.93*** 0.0428 7.60*** 0.0547 9.03*** 0.0427 7.59***
MONTH 0.0017 2.63*** 0.0020 3.23*** 0.0016 2.49** 0.0020 3.22***
ISPBYZIP 55,548 69.36*** 53,850 37.42***





















Exhibit 2  (continued)
Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4









































































Exhibit 2  (continued)
Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4











CTANT 10.85 482.15*** 11.387 550.26*** 11.115 527.63*** 11.383 546.47***
Adj. R2 0.71 0.76 0.72 0.76
F-Stat 545.99*** 1,821.54*** 1,489.88*** 1,708.01***
Notes: The number of observations is 8,751.
*Signiﬁcant at the 90% level of conﬁdence.
**Signiﬁcant at the 95% level of conﬁdence.
***Signiﬁcant at the 99% level of conﬁdence.202  Asabere and Huffman
supports the contention that larger concentrations of FHA sales depress sales. The
coefﬁcients on FHA and VA are 0.0388 and 0.0352, which transform to 3.8%
for FHA and 3.5% for VA. In Model 4, however, which includes both ISPBYZIP
and FHAPREC, the FHAPERC variable is insigniﬁcant. In Model 4, there is a
0.0414 coefﬁcient for FHA and a 0.0204 coefﬁcient for VA, which transforms
to 4.1% and 2.0%, respectively.
These results imply signiﬁcant price discounts and capitalization effects for FHA
and VA sales relative to sales with conventional mortgage underwriting. The
preferred model is Model 4 but Models 2, 3, and 4 ﬁnd coefﬁcients for FHA that
hover around 4.0%. VA coefﬁcients have a wider range, from about 2.0% to
3.5% (4.5% in Model 1) but show consistently lower effects versus FHA in each
model. The relative results imply a signiﬁcant difference in the behavior of the
two types of borrowers, with FHA borrowers receiving larger discounts.
 Conclusion
The results support the hypotheses that homes associated with FHA and VA
mortgage ﬁnancing will be associated with reductions in equilibrium selling prices
relative to conventional ﬁnancing. The magnitudes of the estimated coefﬁcients
on FHA sales range from about 5.8% in Model 1 to around 4.0% in Models
2, 3, and 4. The corresponding price discount range based on the estimated
coefﬁcients for VA is from about 2.0% to 4.5% in Model 1.
Overall the results support the hypothesis that FHA and VA underwriting may
result in price discounts. The hypothesis is that FHA/VA borrowers offer lower
bids to offset the ﬁnancing costs incurred; bids that are accepted by high
opportunity cost borrowers. That is, in some sense, it appears that FHA and VA
borrowers are tougher bargainers relative to conventional borrowers. Although the
study has no information on actual appraisals for the data, it is likely that stringent
FHA and VA property qualiﬁcation procedures may also play a role in these
negotiations.
The conclusions above should be qualiﬁed by the fact that the data do not allow
an isolation of the use of private mortgage insurance (PMI). To the extent that
PMI loans and the payment of PMI premiums are a signiﬁcant proportion of the
conventional loan category, the results would be understated.14
Cost shifting, although recognized in the prior literature, may not be the only
cause of price discounts. For instance, agency bias, associated with seller agents
who recommend the acceptance of FHA/VA buyer bids, may play a role; however,
data are lacking to examine this issue in this paper.
Note also that the Bexar County data include signiﬁcant percentages of FHA
(33%) and VA (16%) sales. Thus the ﬁndings may be unique to markets with
signiﬁcant FHA and VA purchases such as the study area. Therefore, the ability
to negotiate price discounts may be a function of the market share of FHA andFHA/VA Financing and Price Discounts  203
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VA borrowers and that smaller discounts may occur in areas with fewer such sales.
In addition, the wider range of effects for VA sales may be of further interest.
Further research on these effects should be conducted, especially in those areas
that allow for the identiﬁcation of PMI loans. The more recent development of
the sub-prime loan market may also have an impact on real estate markets.
Finally, note that to the extent that such discounts are associated with more
stringent property qualiﬁcation procedures, the FHA and VA lowers the default
risk exposure of the American taxpayer inherent in the risk of higher LVRs and
PTI ratios associated with these programs.
 Endnotes
1 In addition, FHA income quality standards are more accepting of past credit problems
and the FHA generally accepts lower credit scores.
2 Note that the FHA user pays the full cost of the inherent default risk involved, along
with paying a substantial premium relative to the ﬁnancing obtained.
3 In addition to the premiums necessary, the FHA imposes a more stringent property
qualiﬁcation. Speciﬁcally, the FHA requires a signiﬁcantly more detailed property
inspection, analysis, and appraisal process (Tompkins, 2000), as does the VA.
4 The 2% funding fee refers to the fee for active duty-eligible veterans at the time of the
study. The fee has increased over time and can be reduced by making larger
downpayments. Any amount over the limit (currently $240,000) requires a 25%
downpayment by the veteran on the excess (see Evaluation of VA’s Home Loan Guaranty
Program, 2004).
5 See also Asabere and Huffman (1993), Sirmans, Turnbull, and Dombrow (1995), Taylor
(1999), and Genesove (2001), for examples most relevant to this study.
6 There is evidence in the data to support the hypothesis. A preliminary investigation of
the sample reveals a signiﬁcant difference in average days on the market for conventional
ﬁnancing versus FHA/VA ﬁnanced sales (57 days for FHA/VA relative to 63 days for
conventional).
7 The data do not contain any information on lot size by square feet. However, the
variables used (INPOOL, CORNER, CULDESAC, and DECK) should account to some
extent for any superior lot size effects.
8 Ferguson’s Quick-Finder MAPSCO 2000 Street Guide and Directory for San Antonio,
2000, MAPSCO, Inc., Dallas, TX.
9 The rings are constructed using the ZIP Code for each property. Each ZIP Code is
referenced with respect to the highway system present. The area’s encircling highway
system is used to deﬁne four locational areas bounded by rough concentric circles as
separated by the highway system. Classical concentric circle theory would imply that
properties in areas closer to the central city would sell at premiums related to
accessibility and transportation costs.
10 The standard VA limit is $240,000; however, there were no appreciable differences in
results versus using the national VA limits. The data are also cut off at the FHA limit
for the study area. However, this cut meant that the VA sales were nearly eliminated.204  Asabere and Huffman
However, a statistically signiﬁcant discount of 2% for FHA versus all other sales was
found. For these and other regression results not reported, readers are invited to contact
the authors.
11 A theoretical issue here is the possibility that the choice of ﬁnancing is endogenous.
That is, that sales price determines the FHA/VA choice, a consideration of importance
here given the price limits associated with FHA/VA usage. As an anonymous reviewer
notes, one solution would be to utilize a two-stage regression in which the determinants
of FHA/VA choice yield a predicted FHA/VA result. Thus, a series of two-stage
regressions were performed using various combinations of variables for the ﬁrst stage.
In all cases, predicted FHA was found to have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on sales
price. The predicted VA variable was insigniﬁcant, however, in several versions. Given
that the FHA impact on sales price could not be dislodged, the standard hedonic results
are found in Models 1–4. These results should not be seen as a refutation of the existence
of this potential problem. Rather attempts to create a homogeneous database in which
FHA/VA sales are present across the spectrum of sales prices may have minimized its
severity. See Yavas and Yang (1995) for an example of the two-stage regression in the
estimation of listing price.
12 As noted by an anonymous reviewer and detailed in the literature review, credit history
and income among other factors are associated with the use of FHA/VA loans. The data
do not allow an examination of the impact of such buyer characteristics. The SPBYZIP
variable is an attempt to measure any relative FHA/VA/conventional sales price
differentials by location, a measure that may capture some of these possible effects of
the selection of FHA/VA loans. Several speciﬁcations of SPBYZIP were examined,
including Ln(SPBYZIP) and the inverse of SPBYZIP (ISPBYZIP) with comparable
results; ISPBYZIP is reported in Model 2.
13 ZIP Codes are the smallest area-type data available in the data and thus serve as the
best proxy for neighborhood. There are 65 ZIP Codes with FHA concentrations ranging
from 0 to 75% (see Exhibit 1). Both SPBYZIP and FHAPREC were found to be collinear
with the other location variables and thus were analyzed separately.
14 PMI premiums are signiﬁcantly lower than FHA premiums. Generally, annual premiums
are 0.32% for an 85% LVR with an upfront amount of two months premium required
(see Colquitt and Slawson, 1997).
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